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The Real Years of Europe? 
US-West European Relations during the Ford administration1 
 
A three year Presidency constitutes little time to define an era in international affairs.  
When the President in question inherits a dominant Secretary of State from his much 
better known predecessor and shows little of the command of world politics that 
would have been needed to wrest foreign policy leadership from the established 
expert, the prospects of the Presidency being regarded as a defining moment are poor 
indeed.  It is therefore unsurprising that, as will be discussed below, the Ford 
Presidency has been largely passed over by those working on the history of US-
European relations.  And yet this article will argue that somewhat counter-intuitively 
the three short years of the Ford Presidency were actually a period of considerable 
importance in Transatlantic relations.  This was less to do with Gerald Ford’s personal 
contribution than the circumstances he inherited, the constellation of European leaders 
with whom he and Henry Kissinger found themselves working, and the collective 
need for leaders on both side of the Atlantic to confront the most serious economic 
downturn since the Second World War.   The outcome, however, was not only a 
moment of striking Transatlantic cooperation which would stand in stark contrast to 
the much more problematic periods immediately before and immediately after the 
Ford Presidency – it would also be a phase of cooperation that would leave a series of 
legacies which would alter the overall pattern of Transatlantic relations well beyond 
the 1970s.  
The current historiography on Transatlantic relations has little to say about the 
Ford Presidency.  A fairly sizeable literature has recently sprung up on relations 
between the United States and its European allies during the Nixon era.  Several 
recent studies have thus tackled the notorious ‘Year of Europe’ affair – the most 
sophisticated treatments being that by Daniel Möckli and the forthcoming book by 
Aurélie Gfeller.2  Catherine Hynes and Niklas Rossbach also tackle the same episode, 
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albeit from a somewhat narrower United Kingdom-centred perspective, and the 
Anglo-American dimension of the affair is also the subject of several chapters in 
edited volumes and journal articles.3  There are also three relevant chapters in the 
Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz edited volume, The Strained Alliance.4 And 
Marc Trachtenberg has recently explored the episode in the context of a wider 
exploration of Franco-American relations during this period.5  In all of these cases, 
however, their treatment extends no further than 1974 and Richard Nixon’s 
resignation.  Naturally the literature primarily focused on Kissinger does also talk 
about the Secretary of State and Europe.  Even here, however, the main interest seems 
overwhelmingly the sound and fury of the Nixon years and much less Kissinger’s 
period as Secretary of State to Ford.  Jussi Hanhimaki’s A Flawed Architect for 
instance covers East-West negotiations, triangular diplomacy, the Middle East, and 
Angola at some length in its Ford sections, but barely mentions Ford and Kissinger’s 
approach to Western Europe between 1974 and 1976.6   
The literature on the United States and European integration is little better.  
Schwartz stops short at the end of the Johnson era as does Guderzo, and Winand 
rounds off her analysis even earlier.7  A little has been written about Nixon’s 
downgrading of the relationship with the European institutions (building in part on 
Robert Schaetzel’s contemporary denunciation of this) but most such works have not 
taken the analysis beyond the early Nixon years.8  And Dimitri Grygowski’s survey of 
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the US and European monetary integration, while confirming that there was 
something of a rethink during the Nixon years, focuses most of his early chapters on 
either the US-European row surrounding the Nixon shocks of 1971 and their impact 
on plans for monetary union, or on US responses to the launch of the European 
Monetary System at the very end of the decade.9  The intervening period is passed 
over in silence. Similarly both Duccio Basosi’s and Hubert Zimmermann’s work on 
monetary relations examines the 1969-73 period but not that which followed, 
although Basosi has also written on the late 1970s.10 Meanwhile one of the few texts 
currently to attempt an overview of US-European relations over the whole postwar 
period, Geir Lundestad’s useful, but slim Empire by ‘Integration’, deals with the Ford 
period in a couple of sentences – the chapter breakdown includes sections on the 
Nixon ‘rethink’ and the troubles of the Carter period, but nothing on the period in 
between.11 
This article will argue, however, that despite this lack of scholarly attention 
the brief Ford period did matter in terms of West-West relations.  Indeed, it will go 
further and argue that the Ford years were a time when, in a largely pragmatic and 
unspectacular way, the whole architecture of Transatlantic relations was rearranged, 
creating structures and features that would endure well beyond the Ford and Kissinger 
double-act into the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton eras.  In so doing, it draws upon 
research conducted in the Ford Presidential Library, in the collection of Nixon 
Presidential materials (held until recently in the National Archives in Washington DC 
although since transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library in California), and upon a 
variety of sources available online.  Throughout the perspective is that of an expert on 
Western Europe looking at US sources as much for what they demonstrate about the 
jockeying for power and influence amongst the different states of Western Europe as 
for what they show about US foreign policy per se.  The arguments advanced are thus 
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primarily intended as a contribution to the discussion of the West-West diplomacy of 
the Cold War, the patterns of Transatlantic dialogue and the evolving nature of 
international governance. 
 
Rebuilding Transatlantic trust 
The first and most obvious transformation of Transatlantic relations during the Ford 
period was the rebuilding of mutual trust and confidence after the highly bruising 
latter stages of the previous presidency.  Richard Nixon had initially made a real 
effort to foster dialogue with Western European governments.  The briefs for his first 
visit to Europe in early 1969 noted that ‘you will be the first American President to 
undertake a working trip to Western Europe in the last five and one-half years’ – and 
highlighted the positive European response to the announced American intention ‘to 
listen not to lecture’.12 Particular care, moreover, had been given to the need to 
rebuild a relationship of trust and cooperation with the French.13 The March 1, 1969 
meeting between Nixon and President Charles de Gaulle – the bête noir of the 
previous Democrat administrations - was thus both constructive and amicable.14 But 
despite the good intentions on both sides, the successful Nixon visit was not the 
prelude an easy phase of US-West European relations.  On the contrary, Western 
European governments grew frustrated with the way in which the initial priorities of 
the Nixon administration lay elsewhere – Vietnam of course, but also the opening to 
China and détente with the Soviet Union – and the new, more nationalistic edge to US 
economic and monetary policies.  The Americans meanwhile, and especially 
Kissinger, seemed highly sensitive to any sign that the Europeans were ganging up on 
the US.  The terminal agonies of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the 
European attempt to shield themselves from these problems by creating a regional 
zone of exchange rate stability, were thus accompanied by a level of Transatlantic 
resentment and mutual sniping that cast doubt on the longstanding US policy of 
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supporting European integration for political reasons and regardless of the economic 
costs.15   
Kissinger’s belated and poorly handled attempt to address these uncertainties 
through his ‘Year of Europe’ initiative only made matters worse.  Not only did the 
National Security Advisor misjudge the tone of the speech – most notoriously with 
the passage that, in contrasting Europe’s ‘regional interests’ with the United States’ 
‘global responsibilities’, seemed to endorse a reality that all European leaders were 
keen to change – but his central message, namely that Transatlantic problems needed 
to be dealt with ‘comprehensively’ proved counterproductive.16 For a holistic 
approach would maximise American bargaining strength and European weakness.  
The economic gap between the US and Western Europe had narrowed considerably 
over the postwar decades.  On economic matters, the Europeans could with some 
justification expect to be considered as near equals by the US.  The military balance 
by contrast had if anything become even more uneven, not least because of the way in 
which nuclear arsenals had become the key yardstick of international power.  An 
approach that lumped together economic, political and security questions also entirely 
overlooked the way in which the gradual integration of Europe meant that in some 
policy fields, such as trade, the newly enlarged European Community had to deal as a 
single entity with the US whereas in others the individual European states retained 
their full autonomy.  A single undifferentiated dialogue was hence not practical.  The 
very suggestion of one however only confirmed the suspicions of those many 
Europeans who had long feared that Kissinger neither liked nor understood the 
integration process.  The European response, meanwhile, namely to respond to 
Kissinger’s call for a new Atlantic charter by drafting one collectively, only frustrated 
the Americans further and made yet more explicit Kissinger’s impatience with 
European cooperation.17 The slow-moving realities of European collective diplomacy 
and their inevitable corollary that presentational responsibilities would fall to whoever 
held the six-month rotating EC presidency – in this case Denmark - collided head-on 
with the preferences of a US foreign policy supremo who favoured secretive bilateral 
bargaining and who had notoriously little patience for small state representatives.  As 
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Kissinger complained: ‘there is no real negotiation, since the Europeans state their 
position, we state ours, and then the Europeans go away to work out their response 
after which the whole process is repeated.  Thus, whereas we had hoped that the 
Common Market would lead to better relations with the U.S., we are now forced into 
a type of consultation that is worse than we have with any other country.’18  An 
attempt to improve Transatlantic relations thus went disastrously awry, accentuating 
rather than mitigating the structural problems the initiative had been intended to 
address.  It has been pointed out with some justification that there is scarcely a period 
when relations between the United States and Europe have not been described as 
being ‘in crisis’ – a state of affairs which might have something to do with the fact 
that it is always much easier to make a speech, place an article, or sell a book with 
‘crisis’ in the title, than one with ‘status quo’, ‘calm’ or still worse ‘consolidation’.  
But if any period can justifiably claim to be one of Transatlantic crisis it is the Nixon 
years from 1970 to 1973. 
 The process of mending fences had, admittedly, begun before Gerald Ford 
took office.  The rapid disappearance from the political scene in the first months of 
1974 of all three of the European leaders most involved in the Year of Europe spat -
Georges Pompidou, Willy Brandt and Edward Heath - through death, resignation and 
electoral defeat respectively, proved extremely helpful in drawing a line under the 
affair.  That their replacements, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, and 
Harold Wilson were all more Atlanticist in their leanings made this near simultaneous 
cast change even more significant.19  But the full extent of the transformation would 
only become apparent once Nixon himself had left office in August.  The healing of 
the Transatlantic rifts can thus be accurately associated with the Ford era. 
 First and least surprising of the changes in Western European policy towards 
Transatlantic relations, was the effort by the new Labour government in Britain to 
undo any suggestion that Britain was de-emphasising the special relationship in the 
interest of closer ties to its new Community partners.  Over recent years a lively 
historiographical debate has sprung up about how far Edward Heath actually went in 
redirecting the United Kingdom’s foreign policy priorities away from the United 
States and towards Europe.  Kissinger himself had been one of those responsible for 
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popularising the notion that Heath forewent close ties to Nixon in favour of greater 
European commitment.20   Nor was this just a line taken in his memoirs: in 1974 
itself, he described Heath to Nixon as ‘the only British leader who was indifferent to 
the United States.  All the rest preferred ties to the U.S. rather than to Europe.’21   But 
a succession of younger scholars have challenged this established view, suggesting 
instead that the pull of Washington over London remained strong and that a great deal 
of Anglo-American cooperation continued unhindered.22   While this new work does 
go a long way towards demonstrating that the Conservative leader did not deliberately 
seek to weaken links with the US, however, it in no way disproves Heath’s 
commitment to greater European involvement.  The effort to lead Britain into the EEC 
was the foreign policy priority of the premiership and even before the UK had 
formally become a member, Heath participated enthusiastically in the collective 
European effort to create a more unified foreign policy. At a time of Transatlantic 
tension and US impatience with the practical effects of European integration, such a 
pro-European stance was bound to create problems between London and Washington.  
As a result, Heath’s replacement by a Wilson-led government that was much less pro-
European – almost the first action of the incoming Labour team was to request a 
‘renegotiation’ of Britain’s terms of entry23 – lessened some of the difficulties in the 
Anglo-American relationship.  It was true admittedly that neither Ford nor Kissinger 
appear to have had much time for Harold Wilson himself.  The Secretary of State, 
typically, dismissed the new British Prime Minister as a ‘sneaky, devious character’ 
and ‘a greasy sort of man’.24   The bilateral encounters at the top level were often 
rather unfocused and unproductive during the Ford period.25  And it was also the case, 
as will be stressed below, that the growing economic woes of the United Kingdom 
under Wilson’s leadership, tended to marginalise the British in the Transatlantic 
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dialogue about how best to respond to the global recession.  But Kissinger did quickly 
strike up a stronger relationship with James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, 
and Anglo-American conversations about political and security related developments 
rapidly regained a high degree of trust and shared interest.26  1974 until 1976 may not 
feature prominently in any list of periods when the ‘special relationship’ has been at 
its most intimate or intense.  It was nonetheless a marked improvement on the period 
that had gone immediately before. 
 Second and of still greater significance for what was to follow was the 
improvement in relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  Helmut Schmidt was a much more reassuring figure than Willy Brandt had 
been, with neither the suspect leftist leanings of the former Chancellor, nor his desire 
to prioritise dealings with both Eastern Europe and his Western European partners 
over the Bonn-Washington relationship.27  He and Kissinger moreover were friends 
and sparring partners of long-standing: Kissinger told Ford that he had first met him 
in 1957 as ‘a brash young senator from Hesse’.28  This is impossible to verify, but 
certainly as early as 1969 a note from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security 
Council to the National Security Advisor urged Kissinger ‘to utilize your personal 
relationship with Schmidt to make some basic points about the US-German 
relationship.’29  The Defence Minister and then, from July 1972 the Minister of 
Finance, had in other words become the interlocutor whom Kissinger could most trust 
in a West German government towards which his feeling were decidedly mixed.  
Once Schmidt became Chancellor this level of trust became even more important.  
And the links between them were strengthened by their shared interest in strategic 
affairs and by Kissinger’s evident respect for Schmidt’s economic expertise – and 
made light of the misgivings that the US policy maker often had towards left-wing 
political figures.  Kissinger indeed commented to Gaston Thorn, the Luxembourg 
Prime Minister, that the only reason why Schmidt had joined the left of centre SPD 
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 For Kissinger’s evident pleasure that Callaghan had become Foreign Secretary, see FPL, NSA, 
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Schaefer, “The Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik, 1969-73” in Schulz and Schwartz, 
The Strained Alliance, 23–64. 
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29
 NARA, NPM, NSC Country Files, Box 682, Europe, Germany Vol. III, July 1969 – November 1969 
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was that ‘because he entered politics in Hamburg and realized that he could only be 
elected there if he was a Socialist.’30 Similar interests, a common streak of 
ruthlessness, a shared tendency to speak their mind regardless of the consequences, 
and a comparable degree of impatience with bureaucratic or diplomatic niceties, were 
more than enough to compensate for the party political difference between the two 
men. 
 More substantively Kissinger also wasted no time in telling the incoming 
President that West Germany was the European country which would matter most 
over the coming years and that Schmidt was hence the fellow leader with whom a 
strong relationship was most essential.  In August 1974, the German Chancellor was 
characterised as ‘our strongest ally in Europe’31;  two weeks, later, in the euphoria that 
followed a successful bilateral meeting between Ford and Schmidt, Kissinger 
asserted: ‘With the two of you working together, the West, the alliance is going to be 
alright’ and celebrated the ‘miraculous change from Brandt and Scheel.’32 And this 
auspicious start does seem to have been followed by an unusually close and friendly 
collaboration between US and German leaders in the following two years.  
Revealingly Schmidt entitles the relevant section of his memoirs ‘Freundschaft mit 
Gerald Ford’ – friendship with Gerald Ford - and the feeling seems to have been 
reciprocated on the American side.33   
 To some extent this emphasis on the importance of US-German relations 
could be seen as a ‘rebound’ from the early Kissinger years when both Nixon and his 
foreign policy guru had perceived France as the key player in Europe only to see their 
overtures towards de Gaulle and then Pompidou go disastrously wrong.34 The Federal 
Republic might thus be a more reliable partner than the French.  Rather more 
significant though was probably Germany’s burgeoning economic strength – essential 
at a moment in international relations when so many of the most pressing challenges 
were economic - its new foreign policy self-confidence, and its ability to act as an 
intermediary and guide in Washington’s careful and fairly systematic effort to rebuild 
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 FPL, NSA, MemCons, Box 12, Breakfast meeting between Thorn, Wurth, Helminger, Ford, 
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 FPL, NSA, MemCons, Box 5, Cabinet meeting, Aug. 26, 1974. 
32
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33
 Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), 202–221; Gerald R. Ford, A time to 
heal: the autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 220–221. 
34
 Marc Trachtenberg, “The French Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 
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its relationship with the French.  Giscard and Schmidt were known to be very close 
(the two men had served simultaneously as Finance Ministers in the early 1970s and 
had emerged from this most difficult of economic periods with friendship and mutual 
respect intact) and both Kissinger and Ford would frequently consult the Chancellor 
about the best means of reaching out to the new French President.35  Schmidt’s work 
as an intermediary between Washington and Paris was for instance an essential part of 
the preparations that led to the successful Martinique summit of December 1974 at 
which a number of long-standing Franco-American differences were (temporarily) 
resolved.36 
 Rebuilding relations with France was the third and most gradual part of 
undoing the difficulties of the Nixon years.  Giscard d’Estaing was immediately seen 
as an easier person to deal with than Pompidou had been; Jean Sauvagnargues his new 
Foreign Minister, greatly preferable to his predecessor, Michel Jobert.  (It helped of 
course that both Giscard and Sauvagnargues were, unusually for French leaders, 
perfectly comfortable speaking English.)37  The way in which an ongoing rift with the 
French could infect the wider Transatlantic relationship was also well understood in 
Washington, hence Ford’s warning to Kenneth Rush, his new appointee as US 
Ambassador to France, that ‘on occasion they [the French] try to get Europe together 
organized against us’.38  But such was the level of mutual mistrust that it would take 
some time before ties could be entirely rebuilt.  The earlier Ford era memoranda of 
conversations thus feature Kissinger outbursts about French behaviour which would 
not have looked out of place in the worst phases of the Nixon years.39  The French 
refusal to participate in the structures which Kissinger had set up to coordinate the 
Western consumers’ response to the Arab oil price hike was also a source of discord 
between the US and France which would take quite some time to heal.40  And the very 
                                                 
35
 Elizabeth J. Benning, “Economic Power and Political Leadership: The Federal Republic, the West 
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40
 For a non-meeting of minds on the subject, see FPL, NSA, MemCons, Box 6, Ford, Kissinger, 
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 11 
ostentatious French distancing of themselves from any NATO centred initiative also 
went on irritating the Americans throughout the period.41  In the Spring of 1975 – i.e. 
some time after the initial breakthrough had been made in US-French relations – 
Kissinger could still tell Ford, à propos of Giscard’s reluctance to attend a NATO 
summit, ‘It is a disgrace.  To think he can meet with the Communists but not the 
Allies.  I can point out to the Ambassador that you would not take it lightly’ – a 
sentiment the President seemed to endorse, adding ‘I personally resent it.’42  All of 
these features of Franco-American relations were made more difficult, furthermore, 
by Giscard’s lack of a sufficiently large personal political base to free himself from 
dependence on Gaullist support.  The French President had to go on appearing loyal 
to some aspects of the Gaullist foreign policy tradition even when his interests and his 
instincts would have pushed him in the opposite direction.43   
Despite all of these problems the 1974 to 1976 period saw a dramatic 
improvement in Franco-American relations, beginning with the successful Martinique 
meeting between the two Presidents, continuing with Ford’s productive participation 
in the Rambouillet summit suggested and hosted by Giscard, and culminating with a 
visit to Washington in May 1976 in the course of which the French President was 
quite open about his desire to be cooperative with the US.44  The somewhat effusive 
claim by Ambassador Rush to Ford in January 1977 that ‘at Martinique you laid the 
basis for the best U.S. –French relations ever’ should probably be viewed with all the 
scepticism necessary when interpreting a farewell visit to an outgoing president by an 
ambassador whom he had appointed.45  But rather more trustworthy was the spectacle 
a month or two earlier of Kissinger advising the President not to side with his own 
Secretary of Commerce, Frederick Dent, in a row over the US tariff on cognac, so as 
to avoid a fight with France in his last few weeks in office.46  The contrast with the 
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bellicose and combative language that Kissinger had been using about France two 
years earlier could hardly have been more stark. 
 Also important in this general trend towards better bilateral relations between 
Washington and its main European allies, was the way in which Kissinger himself 
appeared to have learnt the dangers of trying too hard to play one European power off 
against another.  One of the most insidious aspects of the Year of Europe affair had 
been the National Security Advisor’s tendency to use his various back-channels to the 
main European leaders to convey a subtly different message to each.  Needless to say 
such Machiavellian games had played directly to the somewhat competitive element 
that has always existed in West European jockeying for influence, intimacy and trust 
in Washington and had made it still more difficult for Paris, Bonn and London to 
devise a common stance towards the US.  During the Ford period, however, there are 
few signs of this game continuing.  Instead, Transatlantic transparency was helped 
both by the trend towards direct communication either between leaders themselves or 
their foreign ministers rather than through unofficial back channels, and by the 
growing number of multilateral encounters.  If the key problems of the day were 
going to be discussed à quatre, à cinq, à six, or à sept (the issue of how many 
countries should be included in multilateral discussions will be looked at below), 
there was little point in trying to arouse suspicions in one European capital about the 
behaviour of their partners since such mistrust would only serve to snarl up 
multilateral diplomacy in which the US itself was directly engaged. 
 
Towards a political directorate? 
In his stimulating study of the early years of European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
the mechanism for foreign policy coordination created by the EC member states in the 
early 1970s, Daniel Möckli paints a generally convincing picture of the way in which 
the short-lived hopes of genuine European foreign policy emancipation from Nixon’s 
America faded in the course of 1974.  In particular he argues that the so-called 
Gymnich compromise of June 10, 1974 (named after the German castle where the 
foreign ministers of the nine EC member states – the Nine - gathered to hammer out a 
compromise on the issue of how the EPC should relate to the US) made it all but 
inconceivable that the Nine would take a united stance to which the US was opposed. 
Under the new rules an item could only remain on the EPC agenda were the Nine in 
agreement about how to handle consultation with the US.  A single loyally Atlanticist 
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member state could thus force an issue which displeased the US off the European 
agenda.  The radical vision of multilateral cooperation within Europe enabling the 
Nine to acquire the collective strength to say ‘no’ to US leadership, thus faded in the 
face of the British, but also the German and even the French, desire to rebuild 
bilateral links with the United Sates.47 
 By stopping his analysis at the end of the Nixon presidency, however, Möckli 
rather overlooks the way in which this very bilateralism also brought about a 
significant change in the pattern of Transatlantic relations.  The abortive end to a truly 
revolutionary change in Transatlantic change did not, to put it slightly differently, lead 
to a simple return to the status quo ante but instead to a less radical, but still 
important, alteration in the pattern of ties between the US and Western Europe.  For in 
the course of 1974-6 bilateral discussions between Washington and the three largest 
European capitals became more intense, and more equal in terms of the relative 
standing of the three European powers involved, than ever before.  Furthermore, the 
Americans fell into a habit of Transatlantic consultation that European partners had 
periodically sought (and fleetingly believed they had attained) but which before the 
1970s the Americans had always fought shy of institutionalising.48  The NSC country 
files of the Ford Administration thus reveal a pattern of growing consultation and 
discussion between Kissinger and the foreign ministers of Britain, Germany and 
France.  At first the French were excluded from much of this correspondence.  Thus 
in August of 1974, at the height of the Cyprus crisis, Kissinger had written in fairly 
similar terms to both Callaghan and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German 
foreign minister – but not yet Sauvagnargues – appealing for any ideas they might 
have on how to resolve the crisis.49  But in the course of 1975 the steady improvement 
of US-French relations turned these ad hoc three-way consultations into a much more 
regular pattern of four-power discussions, involving regular meetings, both official 
and ministerial, as well as intensive correspondence.  A September 1975 brief from 
Kissinger to the President underlined quite how far these had developed: 
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‘Taking up a suggestion put forward by UK Foreign Secretary Callaghan, I 
convened two extended dinner meetings in New York on September 5 and 24 
[1975] with my French, British and West German colleagues, to discuss the 
sensitive questions of NATO’s Southern Flank, specifically Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.  The next such meeting will take place 
during the December NATO Ministerial in Brussels.  In the meantime, senior 
officials of the four foreign ministries will meet, as they have twice in the past 
two weeks, to follow up the Ministerial discussions and to prepare analyses for 
the next meeting.  The initial purpose of these sessions was to exchange 
assessments, develop common policies, and coordinate out actions in Southern 
Europe. 
The foreign ministers are, however, ranging much more broadly over Western 
interests and policies and as a result a de facto political steering group is 
emerging.  This is something the French have in various ways been seeking 
since de Gaulle in the early sixties; yet at the same time they are extremely 
sensitive about these meeting, both because of likely domestic Gaullist and 
left-wing criticism if they become known, and because of resentment among 
the smaller members of the Nine.  For us, these meetings give us what we 
struggled for fruitlessly during the “year of Europe” – organic association in 
which we work jointly on common problems.’50 
 
So why had a model of Transatlantic dialogue that both the British and the French had 
sought in vain in the 1950s (albeit without German participation), and which 
Kissinger had suggested in 1973 only to have the idea indignantly rejected by the 
Europeans, come to partial fruition by 1975?51 
 It helped of course that the 1974-6 period was one in which the United States 
felt severely over-stretched and where the executive was acutely conscious of the way 
in which an assertive Congress was intent upon (and partially successful in) clipping 
the foreign policy making wings of President and Secretary of State.  In circumstances 
where Congress had disregarded Presidential pleas and imposed an arms embargo 
upon Turkey that only added to instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, it made 
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logical sense to use European allies as intermediaries in the struggle to avoid either 
Greek-Turkish confrontation or Turkey abandoning the alliance entirely.52  It also 
helped that the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean were not the only primarily 
European crisis of the period.53   The aftermath of Portugal’s Carnation Revolution, 
the fate of Spain once the ailing General Franco died, and the issue of whether or not 
the electorally weakened Italian Christian Democrats would bow to pressure and 
conclude the much discussed compromesso storico bringing the Italian Communist 
party (PCI) into government, were all pressing concerns, and all issues on which 
European allies had means of influence and sources of information that 
complemented those of the United States.54  Even the still mistrusted Willy Brandt 
was listened to with interest - if not much agreement - when he talked about his 
contacts with Mario Suarez and other Portuguese democratic leaders.55  Cooperation 
in Europe’s own backyard made sense, especially once the Europeans had largely 
abandoned their unwelcome attempts to engage themselves politically into the Middle 
Eastern peace process.  
 It was not just on European affairs that the US, and Britain, France and 
Germany established their new pattern of regular consultation and cooperation.  Had 
it been, after all, it might have offended those same European sensibilities which had 
been so riled by the tactless contrast that Kissinger had drawn in his Year of Europe 
speech between America’s global responsibilities and Europe’s regional interests.  
But in fact joint discussion and planning also encompassed African affairs: Giscard 
was able to interest the Americans in his idea of a generalised increase in aid towards 
sub-Saharan Africa;56 the US was well aware and intent on exploiting Britain’s long-
standing links with southern Africa;57 and Washington was very conscious that the 
Federal Republic was one of the few Western countries with deep enough pockets to 
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provide aid in Angola and elsewhere.58  And the main European allies were equally 
central to the much more general debate about how the global economy might be 
revived and how the imbalances and stresses triggered by the oil crisis might be 
resolved.  The United States could not address these problems alone and was hence 
keen to involve the big three European powers - and the Japanese - as much as was 
possible. 
 Another factor which facilitated the emergence of this quasi political 
directorate was the temporary near equivalence of power of the three Western 
European powers and the widening of the gap between them and their closest 
European challenger.   In terms of objective power, the Federal Republic of Germany 
was undeniably the strongest of the European big three.  The 1970s were a time when 
its relative economic strength reached its apogee (its share of world trade rivalled that 
of the United States during the first part of the decade and would not be overtaken by 
that of Japan until the late 1970s) and economic power was backed up by budgetary 
wealth, the consequent ability to avoid the type of aid and defence spending cut-backs 
that other states were obliged to make during the economic downturn, and a newly 
acquired readiness to speak its mind in international affairs.  That it also had a 
Chancellor who was unusually expert on the type of economic issues that loomed so 
large on the international agenda, but could also speak with authority and knowledge 
on pressing security issues, again only accentuated the Federal Republic’s burgeoning 
influence.59  But for all its new found power, Germany of the 1970s remained a 
country highly conscious of the weight of the past and of its anomalous and divided 
state, and very loath to punch its full weight whether in Europe or beyond.  It 
therefore went on being instinctively drawn towards cooperation with the other major 
Western powers rather than more hazardous unilateral operations.  To put it in 
musical terms, Germany for all its new found confidence, was more at home as a 
chamber musician than as a soloist.  It was therefore very ready to play harmoniously 
with Britain and France – as well, ideally, as with the Americans also - rather than 
striking out on its own. 
 If the 1970s were the apogee of German relative power, they were the nadir 
for British strength and influence.  The British economy has seldom performed worse 
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than it did between 1973 and the end of the decade; British internal politics has rarely 
been as fractious and divided.  1976 after all was famously the year in which the IMF 
had to be called in to rescue the British economy, while the decade also saw both the 
Labour Party and the Conservatives fall prey to deep internal divisions and engage in 
increasingly bitter contestations with each other.60 The hoped-for solution to Britain’s 
economic and political woes, namely EEC membership, had turned out moreover to 
be source of further controversy and further dissatisfaction rather than the promised 
panacea.  No sooner had the British entered ‘Europe’ than they found themselves at 
odds with their supposed new partners, engaged in a lengthy but ultimately almost 
entirely fruitless renegotiation of the terms of membership, and deeply divided 
amongst themselves as to whether Heath’s great achievement was a backwards or 
forwards step.61  Britain’s turbulent career as the leader of the European 
Community/Union’s awkward squad had begun.  But for all these problems Britain 
retained enough of the habits and reflexes of a former great power, especially when 
dealing with Washington, to go on acting as one of the European big three.  The 
multiple levels of the dialogue between British and American officials that have 
always been the special relationship’s core strength persisted even at the height of the 
United Kingdom’s most troubled decade, enabling London to play a role in the 
Transatlantic debate out of all proportion to its objective strengths.  This was 
particularly the case when discussion centred on political and security affairs rather 
than economics. 
 The French meanwhile occupied an intermediate position between German 
economic strength and British economic weakness.  Had the ‘realities behind 
diplomacy’, to use Paul Kennedy’s phrase, been the sole factor in determining the 
Transatlantic power hierarchy, France would have been some way behind Germany 
for much of the 1970s but some way ahead of Britain.62  Its economic performance 
lay some distance behind the former and some way ahead of the latter.  As it was 
however its position was equally affected by several less objective measures.  Thus 
the Franco-American relationship both derived strength from and was weakened by 
the legacy of previous tension between Paris and Washington.  Ford and Kissinger 
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were that much more assiduous in their efforts to flatter, charm and woo Giscard, 
because of their awareness that French goodwill was much less automatic than that of 
Britain or Germany.  For similar reasons they were ready to tolerate a series of 
anomalies and inconsistencies in France’s pro-Atlantic stance that would not have 
been as easily accepted had they involved either London or Bonn – notably France’s 
ongoing refusal to participate fully in the international structures devised to respond to 
the oil crisis.  But the exceptionalism of the Washington-Paris entente of the mid-
1970s also meant that the relationship was more fragile and less deep than either the 
special relationship or the ties between Washington and Bonn.  When the socialist 
leader François Mitterrand sought to arrange a meeting with Ford in August 1975 for 
instance, the NSC advice on the subject rather pointedly observed that no pattern of 
regular meetings existed with the leader of the French opposition, in marked contrast 
to the state of affairs with Britain and Germany, where both Margaret Thatcher and 
Helmut Kohl had been received at the White House.63  As a result, Mitterrand did not 
meet the President.  The durability of Franco-American rapprochement were Giscard 
to lose power was hence open to considerable doubt. 
 The net effect of all this was, however, to make the 1970s a period of 
remarkable equality in terms of all three key bilateral Transatlantic relationships.  
Whether measured in terms of the frequency of the meetings, the numbers of subjects 
discussed, or the willingness to share secrets, each of the European big three was 
treated in pretty similar fashion by the Ford administration.  Naturally differences 
remained.  The Germans were thus the partners of choice for most economic affairs; 
Britain’s strength meanwhile remained security and intelligence cooperation.  And as 
argued above, the newness of the Franco-American entente gave an edge and an 
intensity to high level encounters between the US and France which was largely 
absent from the more ‘normal’ discussion between the US and Germany or the US 
and Britain. But the overall effect was to create a more balanced situation between the 
three powers than had prevailed in most earlier periods and to lessen (although never 
to eliminate entirely) the jealously and rivalry between the United States’ three 
European lieutenants.  And this balance was further strengthened by the fact that the 
only other European power which might have aspired to join the ‘big three’, namely 
Italy was going through such a period of economic and political disaster that its 
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claims for equal treatment were exceptionally weak.  It is true admittedly that the 
Italians did successfully argue their way into the early economic summits on the 
grounds that exclusion from high level international dialogue would weaken still 
further the prestige of the ruling Christian Democrats and thereby accentuate Italy’s 
internal weaknesses.64  But while Aldo Moro and his successors would attend the 
Rambouillet and Puerto Rico summits (and all other subsequent G6 or G7 meetings), 
Italy was in most other respects more the object of concerned Transatlantic dialogue 
than a fully fledged participant.  In the wake of the Puerto Rico summit for example 
the United States, the British, the Germans and the French met secretly in Paris for an 
emergency discussion of how to put together an economic aid package for Italy to be 
offered to Rome only in return for a cast iron pledge that the PCI would not be invited 
to join the Italian government.65 
 
Economic summitry and the downplaying of NATO 
The other fundamental alteration in the international architecture that was to take 
place during the Ford years was the advent of regular multilateral summitry between 
the main five, then six, and finally seven Western powers.  Bilateral economic 
consultation across the Atlantic was of course a feature of the Western system that 
stretched back to the Marshall Plan.  The overarching economic framework moreover 
had been assured since the Second World War by the Bretton Woods institutions – 
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – and, for trade matters, by the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Since 1960, moreover, this 
economic architecture had been supplemented by an institution for multilateral 
economic coordination amongst the main Western powers in the shape of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  The latter’s 
remit had remained somewhat limited, however, and had rarely led to the type of high 
level political meetings that might have profoundly altered the economic behaviour of 
the bigger powers.  High-level economic coordination remained something of a rarity 
outside of the European Community – and even within the early EEC, member states 
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retained essentially free hands when it came to most macro-economic decision 
making. 
 The collapse of the Bretton Woods structures in the early 1970s was to change 
this picture dramatically.  With the monetary stability of the earlier era gone, and with 
a darkening economic outlook across the West made darker still by the oil crises, 
economic discussions amongst the big powers could no longer be left to mere 
technicians.  Instead, first the finance ministers of the leading powers began to gather 
informally – in a forum dubbed ‘the library group’ – and then, from 1975 onwards, 
the Heads of State and government themselves began to meet for what would soon 
become a regularised meeting every six months.66 
 The initiative for economic summitry came from the European side, with the 
proposal being launched officially by Giscard, although it is unclear whether the 
original idea should be traced to the French President or the German Chancellor.67  It 
was certainly something that both leaders discussed bilaterally before the proposal 
was made public and Schmidt energetically backed the French scheme once launched.  
Furthermore, it was the German leader who was largely responsible for turning the 
initial French suggestion of a monetary summit – a notion that would almost certainly 
not have been acceptable to most of France’s partners – into the much more appealing 
and further reaching idea of a summit covering economic affairs more broadly 
defined.68  But nothing would happen without American participation, so the reaction 
of Ford and his advisors was crucial.  This does not appear to have been entirely 
straightforward.  William Simon, the Treasury Secretary and many of his officials 
seem initially to have been opposed.69  In the end, however, Simon’s misgivings were 
overridden and Ford’s assent was given.  Western summitry had begun, the first major 
gathering occurring at Rambouillet in December 1975.70 
 This was a major development.  For a start it placed a much greater obligation 
on each leading Western government to consult about the main aspects of its 
economic policy.  It was true of course that the G5, G6 and G7 imposed no formal 
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obligation on any of its participants.  Any participant could in theory walk away from 
the meeting and then do precisely the opposite of what had been agreed collectively.  
More seriously perhaps, the lack of well-developed structures for following up 
decisions taken at Western summit level, did mean that compliance with what had 
been decided was less thorough than was the case in comparable European structures 
which did have well-established enforcement mechanisms.  But the start of summitry 
nonetheless signalled a major change.  First it highlighted the fact that economic 
affairs and in particular a response to the global crisis was the priority field of 
governmental action.  Second it reinforced the personal commitment of individual 
Western leaders to economic policy decision-making.  Neither domestic economic 
policy-making nor international coordination of efforts to fight inflation, combat 
energy shortages, or re-start economic growth were any longer matters that could be 
left to finance ministers and their staffs.  This in turn made it less likely, although not 
impossible, that individual countries would carry out major economic policy changes 
without giving any advance warning to their foreign counterparts – it is a genuinely 
open question whether the Nixon shocks of 1971 could have been carried out in an era 
of regular Western economic summitry.  Third, economic summitry drew a much 
more clear-cut line between the big and the small players in the world economy than 
previous decision-making structures.  Giscard’s vision of the summits as an informal 
fireside chat involving just the key leaders would fade over time as the membership 
gradually rose, as the structure became more bureaucratized, and as the size of each 
national delegation increased inexorably.71  But the basic notion of singling out a 
small group of key countries as those primarily responsible for the direction and 
health of the international economy remained and was an important departure from 
previous practice.  Fourth, and of particular importance for the argument of this 
article, the advent of summitry represented a remarkable acknowledgement of 
Europe’s weight in global economic decision making.  Four of the six participants at 
Rambouillet were Western European (Germany, France, Britain and Italy; the two 
non-Europeans were the US and Japan) and while the Canadians would participate 
from the Puerto Rico summit of June 1976 onwards, this move away from European 
over-representation was more than off-set by the subsequent agreements to permit the 
participation of first the European Commission President and then, from the early 
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1980s onwards, also of the country representing the rotating Presidency of the EC.72  
At most G7 summits from 1982 onwards, three non-European leaders were flanked by 
five or six Europeans (the number varied depending on whether the EC Presidency 
was held by one of the larger four EC member states who would be going to the G7 
anyway or one of the smaller countries who did not normally attend).  In meetings 
which did not operate by means of formal votes this European over-population need 
not have mattered too much.  But given the way that the G7 was a forum which 
emphasised debate, discussion and peer pressure, the extraordinarily high number of 
European ‘peers’ undoubtedly had an impact on the sort of concerns that were likely 
to be brought to the G7 table and upon the decisions taken or not taken. 
 Finally, the start of regular summitry signalled an important change in the way 
that the Americans conceptualised both their ties with Europe and the means by which 
they exercised leadership.  Up until the mid-1970s most American leaders and foreign 
policy decision-makers perceived NATO as being the most vital institutional 
Transatlantic bridge.  The regularity with which the NATO Secretary General visited 
the White House would be one illustration of this fact; the way in which US 
Presidents periodically used NATO summits to meet as many European leaders as 
possible in a short period of time, another.73  And the role played by NATO in 
resisting the Gaullist challenge of the mid-1960s would only provide further 
confirmation.74  But economic summitry abruptly altered this pattern.  Suddenly it 
was the G7 that most regularly brought US Presidents into direct contact with their 
European counterparts and that gradual move towards equipping NATO with the 
wherewithal and the expertise to become a forum for economic as well as security 
debate – a trend to which Möckli’s otherwise excellent study wrongly attaches some 
importance75 – came to naught.  NATO representatives indeed became quite anxious 
at what was taking place, with at least one permanent representative complaining at 
the way in which even issues such as East-West trade (an economic topic with a very 
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clear Cold War edge) were now debated at the G7 rather than within the structures of 
the Atlantic Alliance.76 
 At one level this transformation was primarily the product of a changed 
international environment in which economic challenges had become more important 
than security issues.77  Moving the key locus for Transatlantic dialogue away from 
NATO and towards a new structure primarily conceived to discuss economic affairs, 
made sense at a time when the principal threat to the West came not from Soviet 
invasion but instead from the type of internal economic dislocation which was likely 
to push ever greater numbers of western voters towards communist parties.78  But as 
important was the way in which France ceased to be seen by the US and its main 
allies as a likely source of turbulence within the Western bloc – the state of affairs that 
had characterised most of the period when de Gaulle had been in power, but also, to a 
lesser extent, the Pompidou years – but instead as an important part of the solution.  
NATO’s usefulness as a vehicle for solving the West’s difficulties during the 1970s 
was restricted by French sensitivity to participation in any initiative which bore a 
NATO label and by the tendency of senior French representatives to absent 
themselves from key NATO meetings.  Giscard for example did not attend the NATO 
summit in 1974 (despite its billing as a major celebration marking the Alliance’s first 
25 years) and only travelled to Brussels in 1975 to attend a dinner hosted by the 
Belgian King that was not formally part of the NATO summit.79  The French also 
blocked a Canadian suggestion that NATO summits be convened on an annual 
basis.80 So if France was to be brought into any collective Western response to the 
economic crisis and not to allowed to be a potentially disruptive outside influence, 
new structures distinct from NATO needed to be devised.  G7 was part of the answer. 
One final institutional change that dates from this period which deserves to be 
mentioned is the advent, from the end of 1974 onwards, of institutionalised European 
summitry, with the creation of the European Council.81  This was clearly of major 
importance for the subsequent trajectory of European integration history – indeed it 
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was arguably the single most important institutional change in the EC/EU since the 
1957 Treaty of Rome.  But it was also a step which mattered in Atlantic terms.  For a 
start it made it more likely that those multiple European powers that attended Atlantic 
level gatherings would do so with a greater degree of coordination of their individual 
national positions.  The issue of European over-representation in other words became 
even more acute given the fact that on quite a few of the issues that were likely to be 
discussed at G7 level, the four, five or six European representatives would be bound 
to a predetermined common position.  But is also mattered because of the way that 
European summitry softened the division between those European powers that were 
included in the putative political directorate with the United States and/or in the G5, 
G6 or G7 and those that were not.82  Belgium or the Netherlands for instance would 
know that they had a valuable additional forum in which to press their views on those 
European countries that were represented in the highest level of dialogue with the 
United States and an occasion when they could seek to bind the hands of Europe’s 
global level representatives by means of prior collective European decisions.  This did 
not stop the smaller European countries from lobbying, ultimately with some success, 
for the G7 circle to be widened to include both the European Commission and the EC 
Presidency.  But it did make rather easier to swallow the new, rather more naked, 
hierarchy which had appeared amongst the Western powers. 
 
An enduring impact? 
Ford’s term of office was a short one and by 1977 he and Kissinger had lost power 
and had been replaced by Jimmy Carter who would take US foreign policy in general 
and relations with Western Europe in particular in a series of rather different 
directions.  The Transatlantic convergence of the period analysed in this article, would 
be replaced by arguments over whose responsibility it was to inject growth and 
dynamism into the world economy, disputes over security matters (particularly the 
neutron bomb affair), and, most fundamentally, the start of a real divergence between 
a US view of the Cold War that increasingly rejected détente and a Western European 
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approach that continued to value the concept.83  It could therefore be asked whether it 
is worthwhile getting excited about a series of institutional and attitudinal changes 
made in the course of one of the shortest US presidencies of the twentieth century. 
 There are at least three reasons why the changes outlined above do deserve to 
be reflected upon.  The first is that the general US foreign policy approach to Western 
Europe and the behaviour of Henry Kissinger during the Ford period, and in particular 
Kissinger’s seeming readiness to accept a much greater degree of multilateralism and 
international consultation than he had been comfortable with during the Nixon years, 
does suggest that a significant change occurred.  For Kissinger as Ford’s Secretary of 
State appears to have been significantly more of a team-player than he had been under 
Nixon.  Whether this reflects Ford’s moderating influence, the sobering effect of 
Nixon’s resignation, the greater strictures imposed upon US foreign policy by an ever 
more powerful Congress, the accumulated learning from mistakes made in the earlier 
period, or something else entirely is a judgement best left to those better versed in the 
internal workings of the US administration.  But that there was a real change in 
Kissinger’s behaviour and approach to West-West diplomacy at least in the course of 
the 1974-6 period seems to be beyond dispute. 
 The second historiographical impact of the above analysis is to erode still 
further the notion that the 1970s were little more than an extended foreign policy and 
economic disaster for Western Europe.  This has long been an assertion that has been 
open to question, despite the undeniable economic and political difficulties 
experienced by many Western European states in the aftermath of 1973 economic 
downturn: in the integration history field for instance, the identification of the 1970s 
as ‘a dismal decade’ overlooks the four crucial developments of the period, namely 
the first enlargement (1973), the creation of the European Council (1974/5), the move 
towards the direct elections of the European Parliament and the launch of the 
European Monetary System, both 1979.  But what this article also suggests is that the 
1970s were a time when Western Europe actually gained in collective weight on the 
world stage rather than lost influence.  It is true of course that the radical vision of the 
early 1970s, centred upon the idea that a united Europe could become a truly 
emancipated foreign policy actor equipped not only with a single voice in world 
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affairs, but also a single currency, soon faded.  But its replacement by an international 
system in which the United States had fallen into the habit of regularly consulting all 
of Europe’s big three on many of the key foreign policy issues of the day, and in 
which the US had agreed to participate in a system of economic summitry in which 
Western Europe was almost grotesquely over-represented, still represented a highly 
significant advance from the pattern of purely bilateral consultations with Britain, 
sometimes with Germany, and occasionally with France that had characterised the 
first twenty five years of the Cold War.  The lengthy economic crises of the 1970s and 
early 1980s and the way in which their latter stages were marked by a much stronger 
than average performance by the Japanese and by a much quicker US recovery under 
Reagan than was the case in Western Europe, would certainly lead in the medium 
term to a structural weakening of Western Europe’s position in the world; but in 
institutional terms at least, the 1970s were somewhat paradoxically characterised by a 
significant strengthening of Western Europe’s position.  This strengthening 
constituted the belated institutional response to Western Europe’s dramatic economic 
and political recovery since 1945. 
 Finally and most importantly, most of the changes that are described in this 
article would appear to have been remarkably enduring.  No formal political 
directorate admittedly ever emerged.  And the intensity of individual bilateral 
dialogues between Washington and the European big three would wax and wane on 
the bases of the issues of the moment and the personal chemistry between the US and 
European leaders.  But from a first reading of the Reagan papers at least the same 
pattern of regular consultation with Britain, Germany and France which had begun 
under Ford does seem to have endured into the 1980s and probably, in the light of the 
recent releases of documents on Germany unification, up until the end of the Cold 
War and maybe beyond.84  Likewise economic summitry continued with Europe 
continuing to be disproportionately over-represented up until the very recent move to 
replace the G7, or G8 as it had become, with the G20.  Indeed the increased 
dynamism of the European integration process during the post-1985 period at least 
almost certainly meant that the solid phalanx of Europeans who turned up at every 
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G7/8 meeting was even more likely to act in a fairly unified fashion and punch 
significantly above their global demographic or economic weight.  As a result, it is 
fair to conclude that the international architecture of the final stages of the Cold War, 
both in security terms and as far as the management of the world economy was 
concerned, was surprisingly Eurocentric.  This may have been an era of the global 
Cold War85 – but the institutional mechanisms that the West devised to respond to the 
global challenge were overwhelmingly centred on the continent where the East-West 
conflict had begun.   
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